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Treating the Wolf Man as a Case of Ordinary Psychosis 
 
Russell Grigg 
 
The Wolf Man was not in good shape in October 1926 when Freud referred him to 
Ruth Mack Brunswick. Pankejeff’s analysis with Freud, long for its day at four years, 
on which Freud based his “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis”, had been 
completed in July 1914, which was the date Freud had set at the start of that year for 
the termination of the analysis. When the analysis ended and Pankejeff departed 
Freud must have assumed it would be for the last time, satisfied as he was at the time, 
as he later wrote, with the thought that his patient’s cure was “radical and permanent” 
(Freud, 1937: 217). In the event, it was not to be the last time Freud was to receive 
Pankejeff for analysis, as he came to see Freud for four months on his return from 
Russia in 1919. Moreover, Pankejeff was to undertake two more courses of analysis, 
both of them with the American analyst resident in Vienna, Ruth Mack Brunswick, 
who when she received Pankejeff for the first time, was also Freud’s analysand.  
 
I would like to discuss a couple of aspects of Pankejeff’s analysis with Mack 
Brunswick in the light of the hypothesis that Pankejeff was psychotic, a case of what 
we would call “ordinary psychosis”.1 My thesis is that Pankejeff’s psychosis had been 
triggered in a mild form at some moment, probably in 1926, between his analysis with 
Freud and his first period of analysis with Mack Brunswick. I am also interested in 
exploring the thesis that, unwittingly, Mack Brunswick all but provokes a major 
psychotic episode by the manner in which she intervenes in the treatment. 
 
The Pankejeff that consulted Mack Brunswick in October 1926 was a very different 
man from the patient Freud had received between 1910 and 1914. It was not just that 
his condition had deteriorated, but that his symptoms had taken a new turn. What he 
had initially presented to Freud with, namely diverse obsessional symptoms, had 
subsequently developed into a series of somatic and significantly paranoid complaints 
related to his teeth and nose, the origins of which he at times attributed to the 
malevolent actions of the dentists and physicians from whom he had been seeking 
treatment. Thus, when he arrived at Mack Brunswick’s consulting rooms, he appeared 
highly anxious above all about a scar and a hole or groove in the scar tissue on his 
nose that had been caused by the medical electrolysis he had undergone as treatment 
for a sebaceous cyst. Not only was there no sign of any disfigurement, Mack 
Brunswick reports, but also he would obsessively inspect his nose at every 
opportunity, using a small lady’s pocket mirror he carried with him for this purpose. 
The feminisation of this activity (should we see here a crypto pousse-à-la-femme?) is 
not lost on Mack Brunswick who describes “a profound character-change” in the 
Wolf Man, due, she reasons, to the more prominent role his unconscious passivity is 
permitted to play in his life and to a turn to dissimulation and unscrupulousness by 
this formerly conscientious, honest and diligent man. 
 
Despite Mack Brunswick’s observation that her analysis of Pankejeff “corroborates in 
every detail the first” analysis with Freud, she provides details in recounting the case 
that tell a rather different story and that even lead her to wonder, in apparent 
contradiction with herself, whether Pankejeff “was perhaps always latently paranoid” 
(Mack Brunswick, 474). The hypochondriacal tendencies, the feelings of 
persecutions, the ideas of reference, Pankejeff’s obsession with his appearance, and 
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the delusion of grandeur—all of this combines to suggest the view that Pankejeff is 
not the person he was when he consulted Freud. As one reads her discussion of 
Pankejeff’s treatment, one cannot but be struck by the extent to which a picture 
emerges of a dramatically different analysand with a radically different presentation. 
Consider Mack Brunswick’s own summary of her diagnosis (Mack Brunswick, 470) 
which includes the following features: 
 
1. a hypochondriacal delusion, 
2. a delusion of persecution, 
3. regression to narcissism (as shown in the delusion of grandeur), 
4. the absence of hallucinations, and 
5. mild ideas of reference. 
 
If we take Mack Brunswick’s analysis, it is very difficult to avoid the conclusion, 
despite her own declarations to the contrary, that somewhere along the line the Wolf 
Man has become psychotic. And yet opinion in the literature has always been divided. 
Muriel Gardiner consistently maintains that Pankejeff was obsessional, as Freud had 
concluded, and dismisses, on the grounds of the success of the treatment and the rapid 
disappearance of his symptoms, the crisis that occurred during the Wolf Man’s 
treatment with Mack Brunswick as not significant for the diagnosis of psychosis. She 
refers to the views of three analysts who had carried out assessments formally and 
informally – Pankejeff seems to have successfully managed to put the psychoanalytic 
community to work around his person – all of whom concur with Freud’s original 
assessment of obsessional neurosis. As further evidence, she adduces Pankejeff’s 
awareness that his attitude towards the injury to his nose was abnormal (Gardiner, 
389). She also maintains, and with some justification, that his “feeling of being 
favoured” by Freud was “logical enough”, and that there were therefore no grounds 
for Mack Brunswick to consider his belief that Freud took a special interest in him to 
be “delusional or a complete ‘regression to narcissism’” (Gardiner, 389). Indeed, she 
claims, “Freud himself would have been the last person to deny his interest in his 
patient’s welfare” (Gardiner, 389). And of course Freud’s own analysis of the case 
leaves little room for Pankejeff to be diagnosed as psychotic. The indications that 
have sometimes been appealed to, such as the hallucination of having severed his 
finger and the sense of reality of the wolf dream (see Blum), are not probative. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, in his extensive discussion of Freud’s case study, conducted 
within the limits of a reading of Freud’s case on the question of foreclosure and the 
paternal function, emphasises Lacan’s position à propos of Pankejeff, namely that the 
presence of a psychotic phenomenon, especially in childhood, is not sufficient 
evidence of the presence of psychosis (Miller, 2010: 69). 
 
However, everything points to the conclusion that at around the time Pankejeff 
consults Mack Brunswick he has triggered a psychosis, as discrete as it may have 
been, and that when he enters analysis with her he is in the preliminary stages of a 
psychosis the final outcome of which at that point is uncertain – after all, at 39 years 
of age he is younger than Schreber was when he became psychotic and is easily 
young enough to develop a paranoid psychosis. As it turned out, this never 
eventuated, but rather than regard this as evidence for Freud’s diagnosis, as Gardiner 
does, it seems more reasonable to view the differences between the presentation of the 
case in Freud’s case history and in Mack Brunswick’s supplement as differences 
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between an untriggered psychosis and a discreet case of ordinary psychosis (see Lysy-
Stevens).  
 
The term “ordinary psychosis” was introduced by J.-A. Miller in 1998 (Miller, 2005). 
It refers to a form of psychosis in which the subject does not manifest any of the 
classical psychotic symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations and bodily phenomena 
of various kinds, but manifests itself rather in a mild form in which the symptoms are 
often quite discreet. There is evidence to suggest that ordinary psychosis is quite 
widespread and possibly even on the increase—it certainly seems true that there has 
been an increase in the frequency of cases of ordinary encountered in clinical settings, 
and one can speculate on the reasons for this (see Grigg, 2002). The reasons why the 
concept of borderline, which apparently covers precisely those cases that seem not to 
fit into the neurosis-psychosis divide, is unsatisfactory have been well argued 
(Maleval, 2000; Brousse, 2009).  
 
There are several advantages of the concept of ordinary psychosis. For instance, it 
draws a clear distinction between untriggered and triggered psychosis, which, owing 
to the discreet nature of symptoms in ordinary psychosis, can be otherwise easily 
confused. And yet, in the clinical setting, it is crucial to know whether the subject one 
is treating is someone with a psychotic structure that has not yet been and indeed may 
never be triggered or someone whose psychosis has at some moment been triggered, 
but in a subtle way that may therefore have occurred undetected and undiagnosed. 
Furthermore, and most importantly, in speaking of ordinary psychosis, we intend it to 
be understood that making a diagnosis of psychosis does not require the presence of 
florid psychotic symptoms. The category covers those cases where it is very difficult 
to detect any neurotic symptoms or, a fortiori, any definite neurotic structure in the 
patient.  This reasoning that leads from the uncertainty over seeing a patient as 
neurotic to a diagnosis of ordinary psychosis would make the concept merely an 
‘epistemic category’, as Miller (2009, 151) calls it, and an expression of uncertainty, 
were it not for the fact that use of the term implies the further enquiry into the 
particular features of the case that both reveal its kinship with classical categories 
(paranoia, schizophrenia) and explain how it has come about that the psychotic 
phenomena manage to adopt a mild form. Enquiries into this second aspect of 
ordinary psychosis have led to the discovery of a range of strategies that act for the 
subject as a prop or crutch – or, to use Lacan’s term, a “suppletion” – to maintain a 
stability in their being in the world absent from florid cases. For more detail, consult 
the issue of Psychoanalytic Notebooks referred to above.  
 
The view that Pankejeff is a case of ordinary psychosis and, therefore, had become 
psychotic by the time he was received by Mack Brunswick has some admittedly 
indirect support in the I. P. A. literature (see Blum) which is most likely drawing on 
some remarks made in the late 1960s by Max Schur (Mack, 219). This is the crux of 
the matter, and the period of analysis with Mack Brunswick is crucial to the 
discussion of the question of ordinary psychosis. As J.-A. Miller has said more 
recently, “You can doubt the psychosis when you read the Freudian case, but when 
you get the follow up with Ruth Mack-Brunswick, it's difficult to question it”, adding 
that “because he had a lot of neurotic traits”, we must conclude that we are dealing 
with a case of ordinary psychosis (Miller, 2009: 165). 
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To reiterate, then, the most likely scenario is that Pankejeff is a case of untriggered 
psychosis at the time of his analysis with Freud, that something triggers a discreet 
form of psychosis, probably in 1926, and therefore that when he consults Mack 
Brunswick in October of that year, he presents as a case of ordinary psychosis which 
is not to be confused with untriggered psychosis. Max Schur (Mack, 219) also 
speculates that Pankejeff’s paranoia may have been triggered by Freud's illness – he 
had just had his first cancer operation – and possibly the illness and infertility of 
Pankejeff’s wife. While this explanation has the odour of apriorism and one can 
wonder what real empirical support it has, we also know that it would not be the first 
case where the illness of an essential loved one who fulfils the role of suppletion 
provokes the onset of a psychosis.  
 
Indeed, it actually seems strange that subsequent to Mack Brunswick’s account 
opinion in the psychoanalytic literature has been divided over Pankejeff’s diagnosis, 
for, at least from the perspective of recent work in the Lacanian orientation, but also 
with the popularity of the category of borderline personality disorder, it is reasonable 
to think that we would consider Pankejeff a discreet case of psychosis. As for Mack 
Brunswick’s own opinion, she considered that the absence of signs of delusion and 
loss of reality count against a diagnosis of psychosis, but ultimately she really defers 
to Freud, as when she states that “the chief evidence against this theory is his conduct 
during his analysis with Freud” in which there was no evidence of a transference of a 
paranoid nature nor “the slightest manifestation of any paranoid mechanisms” (Mack 
Brunswick, 475). I think we can conclude that Mack Brunswick puts the onus back on 
Freud’s analysis too quickly, for it is at least possible and I think quite likely that 
there were no signs of paranoia in the treatment with Freud for the good reason that 
Pankejeff’s psychosis did not appear until after his analysis with Freud, possibly 
during, but more likely before, his treatment with Mack Brunswick. In my opinion, 
then, Mack Brunswick does not countenance the most likely scenario of all, which is 
that, somewhere in the period between July 1914 when his treatment with Freud 
ceased and October 1926 when Pankejeff consulted Mack Brunswick, there has been 
a triggering of psychosis.  
 
This would explain the clear discrepancy between Freud’s opinion, supported by 
Gardiner, and Mack Brunswick’s observations as reported in her subsequent 
publication. It is unlikely that Freud would have missed clear signs of a psychotic 
disorder in his patient who was in analysis with him for over four years. The summer 
of 1926 therefore seems crucial. Pankejeff himself reports that, having written to 
Freud on 6 June 1926, by the end of that month he was in such a confused condition 
that he was not in any condition even to write to Freud – but Freud, who subsequently 
referred him to Mack Brunswick for treatment, presumably didn’t see Pankejeff again 
at this time (Wolf Man, 1957: 456-457). 
 
On reflection, however, it is perhaps unsurprising that Mack Brunswick adopts a 
position on the Wolf Man that comfortably and, one might even say, reassuringly 
endorses Freud’s own earlier views that had already been set out in his original 1918 
case study, given that she consulted Freud over both the treatment and the drafting of 
her text. It might have been possible to paint a different picture from Freud’s, but 
against the backdrop of the most detailed and complicated of Freud’s case histories, to 
do so would have been a considerable theoretical, not to mention personal, 
achievement; for the theoretical and diagnostic presence of Freud is not, it should be 
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observed, the only manner in which Freud is present in the case. He is there in other 
ways as well — in fact, he casts a shadow over the entire treatment and is a constant 
presence in the transference even to the point, one suspects, of being for Mack 
Brunswick an irritant, if an unacknowledged one, in the transference itself.  
 
Mack Brunswick considers the Wolf Man’s four months in analysis with her to be an 
analysis with Freud by proxy. She writes as if this circumstance were innocuously 
neutral, or even a virtue for the treatment, when she writes, “Throughout the present 
analysis . . . . I acted purely as mediator between the patient and Freud” (Mack 
Brunswick, 476). However, Freud’s presence in the transference ultimately has the 
effect of transforming the relationship between Mack Brunswick and the Wolf Man 
into one of rivalry and imaginary competition between analyst and analysand. This at 
least is my contention. I think Freud’s presence proves to be a serious difficulty that 
borders on being a disaster for the treatment, and I think it results in the serious 
exacerbation of the Wolf Man’s symptoms, effectively compounding the grave 
condition of a man whose psychosis has been triggered in the years between his 
treatment with Freud and Mack Brunswick.  
 
The transferential complexities in Pankejeff’s analysis with Mack Brunswick were 
very considerable indeed: at the time of receiving him, Mack Brunswick was in 
analysis with Freud, as were her husband and husband’s brother; and at this same 
period Freud referred Muriel Gardiner, a subsequent friend and confidant of 
Pankejeff, to Mack Brunswick for analysis as well. Moreover, Mack Brunswick is 
indebted to Freud because he has presented her with a golden opportunity to make a 
name for herself. Pankejeff is already famous. She knows, just as Pankejeff does, that 
being the analyst of Freud’s “trophy” analysand will assure her a place in the history 
of the movement, and that, as Paul Roazen has justly written, “anything she published 
would become famous in the clinical literature”. Moreover, she was, and presumably 
Pankejeff knew that she was, an intimate of the Freud family; Freud attended her 
wedding, she dined regularly with the Freuds, she visited him over summer and was 
on good terms with the Freud children. Again as Roazen notes, “In recognition of her 
special standing, Ruth became one of the few women who received a ring from 
Freud.” 
 
Now, this means that while Mack Brunswick observes that “throughout the present 
analysis . . . my own role was almost negligible; I acted purely as mediator between 
the patient and Freud” (Mack Brunswick, 476), she is in fact no simple conduit, like 
some foreign ambassador sending her dispatches from the Russian front, as it were, to 
headquarters, nor is she simply some place-marker for Freud himself. In thinking of 
her role as negligible, she underestimates, to the point of méconnaissance, what the 
role is that she plays in Pankejeff’s analysis with her and, above all, as things develop 
she misses the emerging indications that the imaginary dimension of the transference 
is placing her in a persecutory role with respect to her patient. 
 
One can speculate on Mack Brunswick’s attitude towards Freud and Pankejeff in the 
transference, but what is clear is that Freud is never absent from the transference 
itself, but then neither is she. This triangle is the background against which we should 
view Mack Brunswick’s strategic assault on what she refers to as Pankejeff’s 
“megalomanic” resistance to the treatment. Whereas Freud had put the onus onto 
Pankejeff by setting a term to the analysis in the face of his unassailable attitude of 
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“obliging apathy” (Freud, 1918: 11), Mack Brunswick engages in a full-frontal attack; 
but it is one with drastic consequences.  
 
Mack Brunswick appreciates that discussion of Pankejeff’s delusional idea about the 
damage to his nose remained off limits during the analysis. The topic was sheltered, 
she writes, behind an impregnable narcissism. Her response is to set herself the task 
of breaking through his “invulnerability” on this and other topics. As it happens, 
however, the two measures she adopts have major effects upon the transference and 
succeed in tipping Pankejeff over into a frankly paranoid position, effectively 
destabilising a treatment that, at four months in duration, takes place over quite a 
short time period. 
 
The first measure, one that has the effect of placing Mack Brunswick in a dangerous 
position of omnipotence, occurs one morning when she announces to an unsuspecting 
Pankejeff the news that Professor X, the dermatologist who occupies a mildly 
persecutory position for him, had died the previous day. She knows that Professor X’s 
death will have been announced in the daily press, but since the newspaper had not hit 
the street by the time of Pankejeff’s session, Mack Brunswick knows that she will 
surprise him with the news of the death of his persecutor. To her satisfaction, 
Pankejeff responds with an overt declaration of his previously silent murderous intent: 
“My God, now I can’t kill him anymore!” (Mack Brunswick, 456) Her satisfaction is 
misplaced, however, as we can recognise in his outburst that the murderous desire 
with respect to the small other, his semblable, his counterpart (“I will kill him because 
he wants to kill me”), has brought the relationship down to an essentially imaginary 
dimension. Such is the effect of this first step in her assault. 
 
The second measure, which she explicitly undertakes in order to break through 
Pankejeff’s “narcissism”, which, again, is an assault addressed at the level of the 
imaginary, is to undermine his mistaken beliefs – but are they really mistaken? – 
about Freud’s concerns for and interest in him. As Mack Brunswick remarks, 
 
He added that through me he was really getting all the benefit of Freud’s 
knowledge and experience, without coming directly under his influence. 
When I asked how this was possible, he said he was sure that I discussed 
all the details of his case with Freud, so as to be advised by him! I 
remarked that this was not the case, that I had, at the beginning of his 
analysis, asked Professor Freud for an account of his former illness, and 
that since that time I had barely mentioned him nor had Freud inquired for 
him. This statement enraged and shocked the patient. He could not believe 
that Freud could show so little interest in his (famous) case. He had always 
thought Freud sincerely interested in him. Freud, in sending him to me, 
had even said—but here his recollection of what had been said became 
hazy. He left my office in a rage at Freud, which led to a dream in which 
his father was obviously castrated. (Mack Brunswick, 457) 
 
Mack Brunswick’s strategy, then, consists of making a concerted, even brutal attack 
on his narcissistic armour by undermining “the patient’s idea of himself as the 
favourite son” (Mack Brunswick, 456), revealing to him his true position with Freud, 
and stressing the absence of any personal or familiar relationship between them: his is 
not the only published case, nor is it even the longest analysis. And when, at the end 
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of his tether, Pankejeff stresses the non-professional nature of his relationship to 
Freud, Mack Brunswick archly enquires, “If such were the case”, then why was he 
“never seen socially at the Freud’s?” (Mack Brunswick, 456) 
 
This relentless pursuit of an interpretative approach that reinforces the rivalrous 
dimension of the relationship with Freud effectively breaches the protective carapace 
that the psychotic Pankejeff has constructed around himself, brutally reducing it to an 
imaginary relationship with serious consequences in the analysis. As Mack 
Brunswick’s own comments make clear, under her concerted attack Pankejeff begins 
to display a series of disturbingly psychotic reactions. Indeed, Mack Brunswick paints 
an alarming picture of a patient who has started to conduct himself  
 
in the most abnormal manner. He looked slovenly and harassed, and as if 
devils were at his heels, as he rushed from one shop window to another to 
inspect his nose. During the analytic hours he talked wildly in terms of his 
phantasies, completely cut off from reality. He threatened to shoot both 
Freud and me—now that X. was dead!—and somehow these threats 
sounded less empty than those which one is accustomed to hear. One felt 
him capable of anything because he was in such complete desperation. 
(Mack Brunswick, 462) 
 
Not having the theoretical understanding – we owe this to Lacan – for drawing a clear 
distinction between the mechanisms of neurosis and psychosis, Frosch follows Mack 
Brunswick’s own analysis of the development, and thereby fails, as does Mack 
Brunswick, to fully appreciate the Pandora’s box she has opened. This failure leads 
him to state without further comment that the destruction of his grandiose ideas has 
brought his persecution to the fore, and raised the question whether the megalomania 
was not part of a defense cloaking his homosexuality.  
 
It is clear that by placing so much faith in the letter of Freud’s own analysis of the 
Wolf Man, Mack Brunswick misses all the warning signs of a potential disaster. She 
misses the significance of Pankejeff’s presenting hypochondria, which ought to have 
put her on her guard at the very least. There was at that point no reason to think that 
what Lacan says in relation to Schreber, namely, “What we see from the start are 
symptoms, initially hypochondriacal, which are psychotic symptoms” (Lacan, 1988: 
313), should not apply equally to Pankejeff. And the two consequences of her attack 
on his megalomania – the falling away of the protective function of his carapace and 
the emergence of the murderous impulses arising from its demolition – are both futile 
and dangerous. 
 
Moreover, Mack Brunswick’s analysis of the Wolf Man has quite special features 
owing to the peculiar conjuncture of relations between Freud, Pankejeff and herself, 
and while the Wolf Man’s psychosis was triggered several months before she took 
him into treatment, which is a development Mack Brunswick failed to appreciate, this 
conjuncture was instrumental in provoking the psychotic episode that must have 
emerged quite quickly in the course of this brief analytic treatment of four to five 
months duration.  
 
Mack Brunswick’s explanation, which is that Pankejeff’s megalomania had provided 
him necessary protection that her attacks had deprived him of, is perhaps true but 
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insufficient, since it leaves out any mention of the crucial relationship to Freud, which 
as she herself observes dominates the transference. Mack Brunswick thinks that 
symptomatic of Pankejeff’s “megalomania” is the claim to a special relationship with 
Freud that is not a merely therapeutic one but a personal and even intimate one, hence 
her dreadful interpretation: “Why, then, are you never seen socially at the Freud’s?” 
She recognises, then, that in Pankejeff’s adherence to a special relationship with 
Freud it is a question of love; but as a result of her idealisation of the figure of Freud 
she erroneously regards this attachment as an expression of megalomania when it is 
actually the mainstay of Pankejeff’s insertion into the symbolic. Thus, what Mack 
Brunswick does not appreciate is that this is a special type of love, for it is 
transference love, which as we have come to understand it is love addressed to 
knowledge. And the addressee is Sigmund Freud, who plays the role of suppletion in 
the case of the Wolf Man. 
 
As the fashion in psychoanalysis turned towards emphasising the analysis of the 
transference, Freud came under the criticism that he had left Pankejeff in a situation 
of life-long dependency on both himself and the psychoanalytic community by not 
having addressed the underlying transference issues in his work with this patient. In 
1919 Pankejeff returned, destitute, to Vienna where he underwent a further four 
months of analysis with Freud. There is a curious difference between Freud’s and 
Jones’ accounts of why. According to Jones, he suffers from “an obstinate hysterical 
constipation” (Jones, 309), but as Freud tells it, at the time Pankejeff informed Freud 
that immediately following the termination of his analysis in 1914 he had, as Freud 
says, “been seized with a longing to tear himself free from my influence” (Freud, 
1918: 121-2n), and after a further four months of analysis “a piece of the transference 
which had not hitherto been overcome was successfully dealt with” (Freud, 1918: 
122n). Freud reiterates in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” that he had helped 
“him to master a piece of the transference which had not been resolved” (Freud, 1937: 
218). And yet, as Ernest Jones comments, “Freud not only treated him without a fee 
but regularly collected from colleagues and pupils sums of money that sustained the 
patient and his invalid wife for the next six years, years when making a livelihood in 
stricken Vienna was a highly precarious undertaking” (Jones, 309). The claim to have 
been Freud’s “favourite son” not being without foundation, then, the transference to 
Freud dominates the analysis with Mack Brunswick, and, in fact, while we can agree 
with Mack Brunswick that it is the disruption to, and the imaginary dimension of the 
attack on, this transference that causes the serious deterioration in Pankejeff’s 
condition, it is likely that, despite Mack Brunswick’s efforts, the situation stabilises 
with the reestablishment of his enduring belief in a special relationship with Freud – a 
belief he never relinquished for as long as he lived. 
 
If it is the case that Mack Brunswick’s strategy is effectively an assault on the role of 
suppletion that Freud plays for Pankejeff, then a different interpretation of the dream 
that Mack Brunswick welcomes as a dream of “good portent” is possible. Here is the 
dream: 
 
The patient and his mother are together in a room, one corner of whose 
walls is covered with holy pictures. His mother takes the pictures down 
and throws them to the floor. The pictures break and fall into bits. The 
patient wonders at this act on the part of his pious mother. (Mack 
Brunswick, 462) 
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Mack Brunswick claims that in the dream it is she who is the mother, who, instead of 
giving the patient religion as the historical mother did, destroys religion and the 
accompanying Christ fantasy for him. But how can we fail to see instead a 
continuation of the aggressive assault on the image of Freud as the suppletion that 
holds Pankejeff’s world in place and whose destruction unleashes the paranoid 
aggression of the relation’s imaginary lining?  
 
This attitude revolves around what we could call Pankejeff’s position as Freud’s 
“informant”, or, as Pankejeff would express it quite some years later, in early 1957, in 
his analysis with Freud, “I felt myself less as a patient than as a co-worker, the 
younger comrade of an experienced explorer setting out to discover a new, recently 
discovered land” (Wolf Man, 1973: 158). And, he adds, “this feeling of ‘working 
together’ was increased by Freud’s recognition of my understanding of 
psychoanalysis, so that he even once said it would be good if all his pupils [sic] could 
grasp the nature of analysis as soundly as I” (Wolf Man, 1973: 158). What dominates 
Pankejeff’s relationship to Freud, and does so across the entire history of their 
relationship, is that Pankejeff places himself as an object in the service of Freud’s 
desire for knowledge. He is always there and one wonders whether he considers it his 
due to be paid, effectively, for services rendered to Freud and the cause.  
 
It should be noted that by placing himself at Freud’s service, as if he were Freud’s 
loyal servant in his noble quest, this desire for knowledge on Freud’s part prevents 
Freud from occupying the position of omnipotence that would be a threat to the 
stability of the transference, even as it maintains Pankejeff in this curious position of 
trophy of the analytic movement. It is this relatively stable edifice that, when sapped 
by the interpretative approach of Mack Brunswick, risks coming crashing down 
around him. 
 
I’ve gone into this treatment in some detail because of the role Mack Brunswick’s 
interpretations play, as I have argued, in the sudden deterioration of Pankejeff’s 
condition in his brief therapy with her. What I have stressed is not the fact of the 
interpretations per se but their nature, namely, that they emphasise the imaginary 
dimension of the transference relationship by the focus on the rivalry over Freud that 
marks Mack Brunswick’s relationship with Pankejeff. Whatever the merits might 
have been of such an approach in the case of a neurotic subject, though even then one 
would still wonder about the role of Mack Brunswick’s transferential relationship to 
Freud, she courts disaster in her treatment of Pankejeff. The Wolf Man’s strong 
transference to Freud and, thereby, the place he occupied as a living psychoanalytic 
specimen, should be seen as a major component of his ordinary psychosis where in its 
role as suppletion it provides stability to his ordinary psychosis with its schizophrenic 
tendencies.  
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